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SIX CAMPAIGNS IN THE DESERT
By LI EUTENAl'\~r M. ANDI<EON 8, ru .N,
The u'ur i" Af6,'" la led from .}WIf II. 1940.10 .U"y 12, 1')43. Ihal I~" oImo,.1
1"1' , year. ITl loohng bark 0'1 il II',' ,arl s e mn, y Ihillg., marc r/ ·ITI.'I IQ{/uy Ihall
al Ole Illn li'hc II, y occurred. We kiloit' "OU' Ihfll Ihi.• "'tIr W<L' IIl11quC in hi. lory,
triO, il. "trallge p tIdal"". "wiTl,) of Ih"e pair" ('f uff II,.i.'e,. at'u (l bollirfidd ",or~
th(lf a thotl and ki./om I 18 long Ulld Oldy a f~w kilomelers wide .. und the imp0l'lr/ll1
role tile••• deset·/ C07llpOigll .• halle l,I",y.·d ill the preS(1I1 World W"r I",.• 1/0W become
(/;8C "libl .
AI (J r re'l" st, Liralennll! A mlr all of Ihe Royal Itf/lion .VUI'!:! Irll.< Ihe ..lory
of Ihue Ihr YC<lr... If ... "rlid. i.. Ihe fir.,t camph'le acrol/,il of Ihi., W'IT 10 lIppe'lT
'n ShuTlglwi,-J\ ..lf.
THE war ill Africa started, like anyother III I I'll war, with acti\rity onland on :; a. ami in the air. Jt
ucgan III re or Ie.: as a ·tudy of the
nemy, a an elTort at (;lllltllcting him and
lestroying. eSjJt'cially by air, his vital
pints, which were sometime:; far removcd
from the r('al front.
On thp Tunil-oian·Lihynn front Oll\t:
mall en ount.·r· of no il1l portH nce tou);;
plac. On Jun ::!o, li'mn' having a~k('d
for Iln armi,ti 'e, aU fighting ceased a.long
that bortl r whil it ntinued on :~
minor 8 al /I t.h Lib. an-Egyptian
front. AI I' Air Marshal !talo Balb ,
th Governor of Libya. was kilJed in
action on J un' 30, Mar~hal Rodolfo
Omuani of Aby;:. 'nian fame took ovpr
tb eommund of th Italian operation'.
r; ral. iI' AI' ·hiuald 1'. Wavell was the
.:ommand I' in Chid of the Hriti'h forces
in the l\tiddle Enl'lt,
War in til ~ d 'scrt ,\ (1,.,\ lIlJthing new
for the BritHI and t.ho Jt.alians. The
qu stion wa.: woulJ th' ekl'lt'rt war b
in fi ucnced hy the expNil'IIC('g of tbe
Europeall war ill I fl:W Hnd IfJ40? But
thes experienc('s were of too recent dat
for them to ha v(' beell adllpted to dcc;el't
warfare; the wa r started m(orc or Ie i'! fJl1
the old LinC'i'!. It, is true tha.t the two
armies W£'I'l' nw(·haniz(·d-t.o n. certain
extont the motor hnd taken the plnec' nf
the ca.mel-that tltf'y were 1l10re nun1l'ro\lloj
in m('n and had a bigger I'll ng uf ad j'm.
But the uld dogma;; of bascfl, lil\('s of
communication. etc .. wCl'e till cOIl;:iu,red
the fuundation of dpsert warfan', thus
limitina the possibiliti('s of the !WW HrI11Y
of the de.ert. ('unRN\uclltly not much
happcned at first. Tho two ail' forceR
bom bcd ('ltCh ot her '" ba",:cR of HUlJply,
the Itnlians pounded Malta, British Coll-
\·oy~. and the Suez ('annl. and thl' ('Iol'my
aLtaek(·d t he haRe" in Lihya and ';Clllt hem
hal.".
Till:: I"IHST ITALlA~ OF}'l:N (\',1:: .•.
~br 'hal <:razia.ni ;;tartcd the fir"t of! n-
ive on Augu. t 13, !!)40. ]n hi" first
push he diu not try any ('omplicated
strategic ma.neuvers IlIlt applied HII pcrioJ'
forces at one point anti slIccC'cd"u in IIL-I
aim .. Hi.; army was quite ~lll II anu
consi.·ted of three infantry re rinwnt.s, onc
machine-gun battl\.li/)/1, 01\C' elllll pany
l'quipped wit.h mOl'tarH. Olll' llrtillery
regi lllC'nt, and some teeh n1cal unit,..., with
support from the; ir but not fl'l)m toe
S('11. Add.itiejnal trl)ups w('n' ,..tat iO/l(·d in
varloul:l pa:-ts of LilJ)'lI.
Hii'! w(·II·lmlanC'"c! forel' [\.CI\·:UH.:Pc! from
Fort Capuzzo aeros,... the borch'I' to :-:ollum.
The defenders wert' Britons. AustrnlilLn~,
New Zeulamlcr",. South Afric'an,..., and
IndianA, (:eneral WavC'1I fell bock, and
the Italinll column 11IIHhed 0/1 Ullt,i1, on
DeccmlH'r 17, it occupied lciidi Barrani,
I~O kilolllct.(>rs in id· F:gypt, taking up
1J0"itilJnH at Maktila. n few kiloml't('fl'!
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east of Sidi Barrani. The British re-
treated with t.heir tanks, armored cars,
and planes; they dynamited and salted
the weUs, but the attackers were supplied
with water trucks and condensing ap-
paratus. AU this time, widespread and
repeated bombings were carried out by
both air forces, and the British Navy
also joined ill the fray, shelling the
Italian positions along the Egyptian coast.
. . . AND BRITISH COUNTERPUSH
Meanwhile, in Cairo, General Wavell
prepared a cOllut('J'offensive in great
secrecy and rei.nforced his army, bringing
troops to Egypt from the Neal' East.
The Briti.sh offensive was well planned
and even better executed by an army
40000 men strong known as the Nile
Army. The attack came as a surprise
to Graziani, owing to the fact that the
Nile Army slIcceedeu in approaching and
deploying uTolUld the battlefield com-
pletely unnoticed, making good usc of the
night and of a 'andstorm blowing at the
time. The attack began on December
JO, 1940. The British al'mored units
drove concentrically on Sicli Ban'ani,
while another column drove past, point-
ing on Bugbug. .I!'irst to sustain the
impact of the motorized columns of the
enemy were the Libyan divisions to the
south of the town, whieh resisted bravely
but were o\'crpowered. Theil' COIIl-
mander, Gencral Pietro Ma!l'tti, (Lied un
the field. The Italians wue now attacked
on aU side~: on land by armored columns,
from the sea by the BritiBh fleet that had
steamed out of Alcxllndria. and from th~
ail' by the British Air Force which ha<J
obtained superiority. Sidi Barrulli fell the
same day. A large number of prisoner::;
and much material were captured.
1'h(' cn~my·..,; l';ucee~s was ffiltde possib!l'
by the f[wt that the battle <1ITay of
Graziani's forces had not been extended
deep enough into the descrt. Thu::; the
encirclement uf hi::; forces eould bp. ef-
fccted within a. few hours during the night
lLnd the British tle-et could intervene
efIectively. Addeu to t.his fuult in t.he
Italian pOtlitionR t hpre wu::; a. marked
superiority of tht' Xile Army in men,
material, and aviation. The enemy's
superiority in mechanized units and tanks
especially enabled General Wav""ll to
exploit his initial suecess to the utmost.
Owing to the heavy losses on the Italian
side, the advance of the Nile Army be-
came relatively easy, the more so since
it \VllS constantly supported by the Navy,
which. hcBed the Italian positions along
the African coa t. Bardia, attacked by
land and sea, fell on January 5, and
Tobruk on January 22. The fall of
Tobruk. the stronghold of the Italian
defense system in Li bya, precipitated
matters, and the enemy proceeded rapidJy
westward, with two British columns
advHnt'ing, one along the coast and the
other south of the Djebel through. EI
Mechili. On February 6, Bcnghazi sur-
rendered, and the two colunUlS jointly
proceeded southwest to Agedabill. and EI
Agheila, where they arrived on February
11. In spite of thi,.,; British advance,
however, Grazianj',; otfensive had not
been a complete failure, for the few
Italian divisions in Africa had compellerl
England at a very critical moment,-
namely, after DWlkirk-to dispatch largtl
numhers of men and tanks to Egypt.
England wa.:- glowing with her tin;!'
victory of the \\'ar; but there was some-
thing to war t,he rejoicing: while the
British columns were marching on Ageda-
bia, they had beell attacked for the first
timc by Ccrman planes. Fw·thermore,
unconfil'llled reports that bad already
been circulating for two months plac(~d
:30,000 Germun trl)0ps in Lihya, with
another 50,000 wuiting in Italy or ell
route. Tht, Jkiti::;h Navy wal'lH'd that,
in view of the heavy Axis traffic in
the central MediteJTune~l.J1,the Axis might
he contemplating it cotUlterattack in
Libya.
At the end ,.f ~''[HL'('h. M.arshal Graziani
\vas rdieH'd of hi ... cOI.nmr~nd at hiR own
rpg \lest ;uld rl'l'hlcL·d by Gt,ncnd ltalo
<:al'ihotdi. 1"01' the Axis position in North
Africa this wa~ [l. dangerous moment.
But it pa~sed. Instead of attempting
to pll h Oil into Libya, thc Brit,ish diverted
part of theil' {urces for the Balkan
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adventure. The Axis recognized its
chance and hit back.
RO:ll:llEL APPEARS ON THE SCE:-lE
Th tllird pllase of the Libyan caUl-
paiO'n was now about to start. The now~ command did not allow the Nile
Army any 1Jl'(~athing space or time to
consolidate the po-itions it had captur -d.
As early as ~larcL. '27 the fir t successful
encounter of German Panzers with British
troop south of Agedabil1 was reported.
This wa nearly 150 kilometers to tho
rear of the mo t ad van cd British po i-
tion at EI Agheila. The Nile Army did
not know whether it WIV coming or
goin 1.
The Axil> u{iensivc was under way.
Th fir t result wa>i 'Lchil'\'l·d by an !talo-
German mechanized di\'i",ion umlf>I' the
ommand of Uenernl En\ in RUlllllll-l. It
German Panzer ex pert. I n a giant mid
and by m an of outtlflllking tactic,;. tlti,;
force took El Agheila, th' uesort uutpost
of Marso. I Brega ani Agedabia. 'J'IH.
British Hi h Command diagnoscd the
situati n prom ptly amI 'orr ct.l)', ami hy
April 3 it h d already given the order ~\l
eva uat Bnghazi, although no A:o,;
troops w r yet in flight. The ltulu-
German forces carried on at top spoed,
a smaU column arriving at El R gimn.
ome 20 kiJomet 1'5 a t f Benghazi, ju t
in tim to cut off th l' treat of the
Indian l' arguard. By thL time the
_(.....J,#""orr_,....
~"..-obol.:~~~.~u,:~..:::o
fvt ..... Z7-Aq- 11.1941
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offensive had turned into a race between
Axis and British troops. Tocra and
Barca fell in rapid succession, and on
April 9 Derna \"<18 in Axis hands.
The main Panzer columll pushed from
Msus to £1 M:echili. On its way it
captured several British generals-among
them General Sir Richard Nugellt
O'ColUlOr, who had been knighted on
month ellrIiel' for his brilliance as field
cOUlmander of the Nile Army during the
winter campaign-and many Ulon. To
complete the success there wa.s need of
boldnet!8, and the Axi command showod
no la~k of that. "'ith great recklessness
as far as thf' lines of communica.tion wero
concel'l1cd, it c:har-ged past Tobruk with
its Briti:-lh garrison, captured Bardia and.
without stopping. reached SoHum on
April 13.
In six days the ground which the
British tl'00p. had needed oight weeks to
l'OH'r wus recaptured. By the end of
t.he month and with applLl'ent ease, the
Axi,; armv drove the British out of
:-lOllUlll. l{dn1neing 10 kilometers into
Egyptian territory and oC('lIpyillg IIlllfllyn.
Pa.;;s. till' gatl' to Lil'YIl.
TWO NEW lDEAS
The' Uariboldi-Rommel offensive of
March and April 1941 was something
new in the Libyan war. In his we tWOI'd
offen ive General WaveH had directed So
T
Thre" puirs of ~alllpUI~IlS ill ~orth ,Urica.
THE XXtb CENTURY
column from Tohruk to the south of the
Djebel; but this was a seconda.ry force,
sent with the idea of carrying material
and food tuffs to the coast of the Gull
of Sirte for the main column that wa.s
advancing and fighting a.]ong the coast.
The new Axis command conceived the
strategical idea that by employing the
main force to cut at the base of the
peninsula of Barca it would automatically
achieve the faU of the entire peninsula.
Consequently, the Axis column following
the coa t was nothing but a mopping-up
unit.
In the logistic field (i.e., the field of
military trn.nsport and supplies), the Axis
command had the revolutionary idea of
exploiting its success to the limit, without
any thought of the lines of oommunica-
tion, which would be organized after the
military objectives had been achieved.
The main result of the campaign wa~
that England, who e attention and force'
were concentrated on the war in Europe,
was thus compelled to distract her
thoughts and power from the main
theater of operations. This was exactly
what the Axis powers had intended.
The Italo-German offeniive had coincided
with tho crucial period of the Balkan
cam paign, and some of the best British
troops hnd to be diverted against the
Axis in Marmarica.
THE SIEGE OF TOBRUK
In Cairo, General Wavell caUtd a war
council, while troops were paslUng daily
through Alexandria on their way from
East Africa to the Egyptian front. Dur-
ing April the British made several at-
tempts to liberate besieged Tobruk, inter-
spersed \\ith frequent attacks on the
frontier and one atM>mpted landing in
the neighborhood of Bardia. But all to
no avail.
Newrthcless, Tobruk was a thorn in
the sid€' of the Axi command, and at
the beginning of May the !talo-Germans
c;arried out un attack against the fortress.
They broke through the first line of
defenSt'. capturing a great number of
artillery emplacements, knocking out a.
score of tanks, and seizing prisoners.
But the British fell back to the second
line of defense, which withstood the Axis
onslaught.
Why the lull in the war of movement?
It had become a war of materia.l; both
opponents were stacking up with arms of
every kind; the war in the desert had
already proved to be a very costly one
in arms, and superiority in material was
one of the keys to victory. In May,
Cairo reported for the first time the
arrival of American material. It was said
that no les8 than 26 US merchantmen,
piled up to the funnels with war material
and convoyed by US naval vessels, had
reached Suez. On the other hand, the
British one day discovered over 100
Junker transport planes on an airfield
near Bengha.zi; they were the same type
as had already been used in Greece to
land field artillery and armored cars
behind the enemy lines.
~eanwhile, Tobruk was still with-
standing the Axis siege. The besieged
fortress received its supplies by sea and,
even though it was a thorn in the side
of the Axis it was certainly also very
expensive for the enemy. Every convoy
en route or that had reaehed the road-
stead was attacked from the air. the
score ranging from three transports hit
to four ships and a cruiser sunk.
With the siege of Tobruk and the
presence of Axis troops in Egypt, with
the anel'thetization of Malta by the Axis
air forces and the nece sity of reinforcing
General ''''avell's troops, Great Britain
had a.rrived at a crit.ical moment of the
war. The African Mediterranean chess-
board demanded all the attention of the
London general staff and the pick of the
Briti b land, air, and naval forces, and
aU the best resources of the Empire were
dumped on African soil. To the Axis,
Africa-the ontpost of Europe-was ful-
filling its task in a llllumer superior to
all expectations.
TANX BATTLE I~ THE DESERT
After a May rehenrsal at freeing '1'0-
bru.k, the British High Command decided
in the middle of June that something
decisive bad to be done to top this
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long-drawn- ut ieg England jud ed
that at the cu't of enormou ",acrific(:'s.
h had a cumulAted Hough Illf'n and
armament to f'nsure the defeut of the
!talo, ' rman forceH in Egypt. (:en(:'nd
WaveU d cided to add ~kill to might b....
adoptin ' < OlIUlcuv(:'r ba•.;ed Oil til· Axi
ommaud' prill 'ipl of "k('epin' d('ep
in the de ·t'rt"·
'"ritb a fein at Hnliaya Pal'''. the tAnk
bat.tle ·tal1·ct t l'idi Omar. [i(l kilumt'tt'r~
from the '0 l~t. with the obviouR iut'a of
turl1in tb Axi po itions of Bardin,
Hum, and Halfaya Pa. s. Fol' three
d til battl wirled in the df', ('I't.
B th '0 fought gaUantly, but OIl th>
third da til n ·my after 10 illg n -ad.\'
50 per ot of hi armored car,.. \\'a'
thr wn b8 k to where Le eaml:' from.
Th Briti b cOll1d not out,manCUVl'r the
A_ . mmand, and th upt'riol'ity in
ta.o . had n t bern great el1uugh to
d id the I »ttlr in their favor. Thi'
ba tI po tp n d th offen in> h.... five
pI' ci u TO nth~. during which Ell daml
bad t a' p 11 \\' -acrine,: tc I di \'('rt
m re ma.teri I () th> African shore".
A T A ULT
The next phas in the Libyan campuign
started on November 19, 1l:l4l. when
en my motorized and armored tmit
attack d til ' Axis po:iitiol1' in i\lartlHtrica
n 10 -kilorn tCI' front. \\'ith n de ·isi'-e
un rman u,' r. the Jtalian Ari te diyi-
'on urI' unded and de troy d part of
th ell m,' unit ftt the end of thl' firi't
day, c ';1)f'lIin~ the rest to fall "Ilek.
Th I attle continued to rage a~ ltAlo-
erman motorized units pns~('d to the
counteratt ck. dl':troying nomer u' tllnk'
and takin pri,.:oners.
At the am time the Tnlorllk fl'ont
fl red up with th' enrmy Ilgain trying
to breA k th· i 'e. As t b· bit t t J. 'rl: w
in violene in the TobrukjBir el G<,bijSidi
Omar/; 'ollum "'quare, an enemy mecha-
nized eolulI1l1 was ;;;jghteel in the fill' south
of t,he d('I,wrt Itnd attackl:'e1 !Jv I talo-
German f~il' I<qull.drons. On t.hl~ 'oUum
front the Itauan -'a"ona division was
heaYily engagl'd lind ,,-jth to d all enl:'my
attacki'. Thl' enemy los~e~ were hi h,
/lnd the c(IJIlmande~ of the 4th Tank
Brigade. (;('neral I 'pt>rling. W8' captured.
In the IIwantime. the enem~' mechanized
units sighted II f<.w days before in the
far south reached (;ialo Oasi , :!OU kilo-
mett'rs ~()II t h-i<ollthC'flst of Agedll bia 11 nd
captured it a few days later.
B,' the ·nd of the month the Sayona
di,'i~ic ,n on the Sollmn front had brokrD
lip all attack..,: t he important po"ition of
Sieli Omal' had h('en recaptured; Bflrelia
was f'il'mly in Axi", hands. Although at-
tacked during t.lw battle by C'nl'l1l,v unit,;
and the ToLIl'lIk garrison rel11Airlf'd en-
circJt'd. HOWl·"('I'. the Axis High Com-
mand wa,.: fight ing undel' unfa \'(;1'11 ble
conditil,n..-: till' t'IH'Ill\' had an pnllrmnlli'
sU}X'l'i n rity in m('('ha~ized lIni ."; ,!,(,t.ruk
wa in the hAuds (If tlu- t'fll·Ill.Y: and thl:'
Axis ",ul'l'li('''' had to cOl11e frlllll B(·n,chuzi
and Tril'<di. :WO lind 1.:1011 kilometers
a wa y 1'('.' Jll'('( iv{·1 ,v. -'1oreover. the lung
:;wel'p taken Ity till" enemy in tht' southern
de.ert throu til ;inlo Oasi wa 0. potential
threat,
A.~TITY TELL
Altb u h the battle was . till Iwi n
fought at t.he ~ginning of Drc€'IIlI,t'1' in
the ollumj, idi Rezegh:Sidi 0111;(1' art'a,
with sucee,. for the Italo-( :rrl11u n fllrres
(which CH,ptul't'd (:C'l1rrnl Ih'ginnld -'1.iles).
the elWIIJY WIiS ul.'o sOllth of thC1 I>jPhf'l.
In fll'itc of t hc heroic resiRtnn('(' put
up hy t Ill' Ita lo,l;erma n flln·(·,;. the
enemy ~rHdually ach-ancl'd \\'('..:tward.
The Briti'h Wen' ulC'C':"..:antly ,.;uJ.1!JliNI
with nt'w fOl'(,(,~; the battle W8 one of
matpriaJs nnd sUJlJdy. and the British
had the ",ul'eriOl'it,.\,. In the Recond hall
uf De(:l'llIlwr all the Djebel with Uem
and Bpnghnzi. \\'a" c\'acuatcd. but Bardia
and SlIllulll. althuu~h cut off from tbe
main Axi., f(lre. "tubLornly kept on
repuI,.illl! nil ('nellly attacks lIJ.1 tu Jan-
uary ).',. 1!I-L!.
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The Brit.ish had succeeded in removing
t.he threat to Suez, but at what cost?
The battle was won by sheer numbers.
The Axi. command's tr~nsport difficulties
and the American material thrown into
the fray without regard to los en route
were the key to the British victory. The
battle was won. not by a.ny special
strategy, but imply by the enormous
reo en'es at the disposal of General Wavell.
The exaggeration of the principle of
"marching deep into the desert" repre-
sented by the sweep of the enemy column
through Gialo Oasis did not carry much
weight in the final outcome of the battle.
Al::! it had to covel' about 500 kilometers
through sheer desert, the column could
not be powerful enough; and, arriving in
a worn-out condition to the southwest of
Agedabia, it was unable to prevent the
orderly evacuation of the Barca penin ula
by th Axis force,.
A MASTERPIECE OF STRATEGY
The Axis command was now faced by
a tough problem. The enemy's 'uperior-
ity in material and men was bound to
remain if not increase ill the futw'e,
wllile the Axi had the usual difficulties
of transportation, the chronic ailment of
a II thes African cam paigns. How to beat
tuc powcrful foe under such conditions?
That is why the next offensive of
General Rommel is the battle supreme
of the entire African war, the ma.sterpiece
that opposed kill and strategy to steel
and numbers and came out victorious.
The new Axis offensive got under way on
January 19, 1942. three weeks after
the arrival of the cnemy. This did not
give much respite to the British troops
that had covered 500 kilometers from
Sidi Omar. fighting hard all the way.
Till" Rtart of this third Axi offensive
reveal" another principle of the Axif' com-
mand. namely. striking hard and un-
expectedly, thus pushing the enemy off
hi balance in t5pite of his numerical
superiority. The principle is as old as
the world: the merit of the Ax.is com-
mand i. that it has lked it to perfection.
On the first day of the offen. ive the
enemy was already pushed back east of
Agedabia. Next Benghazi wa.s reached
and the drive carried on in heavy rains
past Derna, as the war booty increased
and the enemy accelerated the tempo of
his retreat in order to break contact.
Then. unexpectedly. the Axis was faced
by a strong line of defense stretching
from Ain el Gazala to Bir Hakeim.
Great masses of Allied forces ready for
an offellilive, were poised on this line,
the most advanced of the British align-
ment.
The Allied forccs were composed of the
Eighth Army, headed by General A. L.
Ritchie who, tmder General Auchinleck,
commanded a large army with 2,000 tanks.
and 2.000 planes. The Axis forces counted
several big Italian units, among them the
Ariete and Trieste divisions, and the (}{jr-
man Africa Corps under General Erwin
Rommel. The Commander in Chief of the
Italian forces was General Ettore Bastico,
the new Governor of Lib.va. Thf' devel-
opment of the en uing battle enable us
to reconstruct the objective: of the Axis
command. They were:
(1) To hold the British forces in Ain el
Gauda and Acroma.
(2) To tLll'ust at Tobruk, tW'ning the
entire defensive system from the
Routh.
(3) To exploit the ensuing success.
The battlefield to be was the triangle
Tobruk/Ain el Gazala/Bir Hakeim, a rocky
plateau covered in part with shifting sand
dunes and excellent for the defenders.
After many weeks of careful preparation,
the hattie commenced on May :W and,
after fOlll' phases, ended on June 21.
TILE TURNING OF A LINE
The preliLninary phase was opened by
Italian troops that hurled themselves
against EI Ua.leb and forced a brcach
a.cross the first defen ive barrier. At the
same time, concentrations of Italo-GeI'man
armored units alTl\7ed in front of Bir
HakeilU, while other units, turning from
the south, encircled the systelU and then,
pushed north towards Knightsbridge.
On June 11 the defenders of Bir
Hakeim capitulated, and the second
...
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.-\ £!Ianc'(' at tlte mal' ,.;JIOW,.; that. \\ ith
Tol,ruk Hlld I: 'lll!haZI d(·"trtJ\'(·d 1,\, th·
!1I·,·villlh fit!htillg." h,· Ill·an·-t· harl,:.r !o,r
lalldll1l' hi' 1\'\' Illatl'rial fr .. /Il I it h' \\ ll,~
Tl ip(,!i. ~.IH;\l kiIOllld('!'", uWflY.' AI-
tlj(lu~h till' :\xi" cUlllnlHlld had pru\' "<\
it,;elf ~Il ·(,(·,.. ...ful ";0 far in its hereti('al
att.itude toward the old logi. tic dogma
con' rning lin,; of mmuni 'ation, thi'
figur wa prohibitive fOl' an~' ·nmmallli.
Alexandria. i. a fortifi d cit\'. alld l
real ntta'k could not he i;n Pl'lJ\' i,..ed,
There \'IllS n eel of material, flllllllunitilln,
and mun, of reorganizing the troojl';
after '0 long an adn1nce, and the old
hanJil'ap (,f the .-\xi. command. the
probll'Jl) of t I'lIIl"pona t ion. WIi:' f'Y(-r prt'';-
l'nt. j\Jul'('o\'(:'r, therf' were gru\\'wg in-
clicaticl]lf; that an Allied attack on \\'e,.,t
AfricH \\'I\H iIllJllinc·nt.
Thu;; in Sl'}Jtemb('r the war "ettled
down at El ..\I aUKin un u mere 50-kilo-
met('r frUllt bd W (·n the i'E'a and t h
mar:<hy d prc:-"ion of Qatturn, The .-\lIil·:j
contilllled to bring lip all force_ a\"ailaLIe,
find till' ('(,nc'entration uf HrtillE'ry and
arm' on the ,.,hort frollt was telTit-j ,
The Axi;l command Illllde its firl:'t, bid in
Oetol)er, uttacking in furce und opeiling
commenced. With after iLII epic uefense of f'ight,y days was
recaptured by Axi troops which pro-
ceeued ea,.;t to Siwa Oa"i",.
1· it jwt Il cuincidl'ncl', or i~ th('r
som -thin' more to it that the new ..\xi
of'fen,.;in· corresponded chrollologically to
event· of great importance in other war
theall'r",? 1n Ea, t Al'iu. Hriti~h and
Ameri('lln troops. beaten by tb· Japane,;e,
were a",king for help; on th(' vast plRins
clf he !Jon and "olatt the. \J\iet' Wl're
crumblin' allli a"kin' f'H' hellJ; but all
thes ('rie:; for h Ip wt'r' lost in London
and \\'a,.,hinl!"ton bccau"e thl' African war
,~ectol'. afk;' twu \'eur", of war. Wll
"""fllll'\\'illg Ill' the '1110",t illlpo;oing eOIl-
(,(,Ilt ra t iOIl (,f the cOIlJl)iIH·d Brit i,,:h Hnd
AJI1l'1'i('ull war l-£lurt. The Il1nglll't ic
IlITdl" (,f th,' war ('('lIll'a"" "till jJointed
to hl' :\fl iean .-edor. H,.. thl' nllll'll-
nWllll-d :\llj(,,J ",trat(·!.!,\' (,f "Europe Fjr~t"
had to 1)1' t,lll'Ilf'd illto llll ":\friI'H Fir,..t."
wa compll·t l·d in
cupat.ion of Furt
nd Halfayn Pnii',
w r t b
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a wide passage through the mine fields,
penetrating for a depth of 10 kilometers
into the enemy system, and then sudden-
ly returning to its own positions.
General Sir Harold Alexander, the new
Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in
the )liddle East. and General Bernard L.
Montgomery, the commander of the
Eighth Army, then in turn made their bid
at the El Alamein front. Just as a man
who. unable to move a weight too heavy
for his strength, applies all his might at
various points, so General Alexander
repeatedly concentrated his attack and
all his strength alternatively on the north
aud south of the 50-kilometer front.
Alter a battle lasting one week, with a
generosity of artillery sheLLing never ex-
perienced before, the Axis troops gave
ground. taking up positions east of Ma.rsa
Matruh. Again the Axis command dis-
regarded the old logi tic dogmas by keep-
ing deep into the desert in ·tead of using
the much more comfortable coastal road.
In this way the British fleet had no
chance to inter\'ene.
PLA.L~S ARE CHA.:.'WED
On Kovember 8 the Anglo-Americans
landed in Algeria, Rnd whatever the plan
of the Axis High Command in Libya
may ha'-e been they had to be entirely
modified. The German Africa Corp and
the ItaHan troops started to execute a
withdrawal a skillful and bold from the
military point of view as the previous
ad vance. General Montgomery had little
merit in forcing the retreat although he
jumped to the pursuit hoping that the
chance would finally arrive of destroying
an enemy who, apparently beaten, came
back each time stronger than ever.
The objectives of the two sides were
now of the simplest. For the Axis they
were: to retire through Libya to Tunisia
there to join the small forces brought
there by air, to save Ulen ami material
a much as possible. and to de troy what
was left behind. For the British: to
frustrate the Axis plan and destroy the
enemy forces. The maneuver of falHng
back from El Alamein to the Tunisian
frontier will go down in military history
as one of the most perfect of its kind.
For about three months the powerful
enemy armored forces again and again
tried unsucccssfully to encircle the right
wing of the Axis forces, ._u tainiug heavy
losses in the course of thi. Moreover.
the A..ti rearguard, topped its withdrawal
time and again to hit back at the enemy.
At the beginning of December the two
opposing forces were once again-for the
third time in this war-facing each other
in the El AgheilafMarsafBrega region.
Land fighting was confined to minor
actions, while the Axis a,riation wrought
ha voc on the congested su pply line of the
Eighth Army.
The British press was demanding a
twin offensive against the African Axis
forces, from the east and from the we t.
But thing- were not going very well for
the Allies ill TUl.u:>ia; and in the east,
General Montgomery. cautious before.
was now overcautious in the ill-famed
EI Agheila reO'ion. The com promise 1)('-
tween the British High Command and
the EngH h pre.' wa to order a "Free
French" column, composed of mechanized
unit and a camel corp. under the com-
mand of General Leclerq. to march north
from Lake Chad. The "Free French"
were probably very surpri;,;cd at being
asked to attack something that was not
French. ~
On J.\Uuary 18, General Montgomery
reported to Cairo that the vanguard of
the Fl'ench column had contacted the
left wing of the British Eighth Army.
The Axis troops continued their systemat-
ic withdrawal. Tripoli was evacuated
on January 22; and at the beginning of
February the fighting moved to the
Tunisian-Libyan frontier, as the main
Axis forces took up positions at the
Mareth line, which they consolidated.
TURN~G BACK TO NOVE~BER 1942
At thi point we must return once
more to the dar early in November
1942. At that time General Alexander
was piHng up material for his offensive
against Rommel. When news from La
Linea announced two huge convoys,
strongly protected, to be sailing ea t,
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it was generally assumed that they were
bound for Egypt. The French pOSSCt;-
sions in North Ab'ica were basking quietly
in the winter sun, outwardly obcdient to
the Vichy Government. Thus, when the
two apparently Egypt-bolLnd convoys
started landing operations on the Algerian
coast, it came as a surprise to the workl.
A few hour after the Allied naval
units put into the port of Algiers. Italian
torpedo planes were already on their
return trip hllving bagged at least one
crui ·er. The Axis reaction grew stronger
every hour while the enemy retaliated
on the Italian bases of Sicily. Sardinia.
and southern Italv. . An aerial-nuval
battle of the first i'nagnitude developed
all along the North African coast. even
inside the breakwaters of the Algerian
harbor, where submarine penetrated.
Axi planes of every description ham-
mer d shipping, port in tallations. and
airfields. In their coup de main the ALlies
w re using their best ship -large-sized
liners-and the toll of tons sent to the
bottom increased rapidly. E\'ery con-
voy wa potted, and every convoy wa",
attacked. 27 Italian planes and an
unknown number of German aircmft
took part in the struggle.
NO WALKOVER
The enemy was shaken in his dream of
an easy snccess when on November 15 he
learned that the first Axis contingent of
23 men had been landed in Tunisia by
J)lanes. The first handful was rapidly
increa ed by new sea- and airborne troops,
which on landing did not lose any time
in rushing at the enemy marching toward
Tunis n.nd Bizerta and snatching away
before the very eyes of t,he foe the focal
points of the Tunisian theater of opera-
tions. The first reports from this new
battle front were most confusing. The
easternmost point of the Allied landing
seemed to be Bougie. 150 kilometers east
of Algiers. From there the enemy was
reported to be marching east in three
main columns: one in the north not far
from the coast, the centml column
following the railway Pont du Fahs/
Tunis, and the third further south.
One week after the landing, the Axis
command announced that Bizerta was
in Axis hands; in London, Ivan Maisky,
the Soviet Ambassador, declared that
the North African landing could not be
considered the second front it was claimed
to be; and the Allied command estimated
the Axis troops ferried across the Sicily
cha.nnel at 14,000 men.
Toward the end of November, the
front. according to ALlied headquarters,
began at a point located on the northern
coast 40 miles west of Bizerta, ran south-
eastward along the railway to the vicinity
of Mateur. and from there to Pont du
Fahs; further to the south it is impossible
tu tl'1lce a front, but all of the Tunisian
coa"t up to the Libyan frontier was in
Axis hands, and the Axis air force domi-
nated the Tunisian skies. The Allied coup
against Tunisia had been stalled.
TU~ISL\X :l'lUDDLE
On November 24, General Anderson,
commanding the British First Army,
announced the beginning of a greut battle
fur Tunis and Bizerta. But thc grcat
battle turned intu a muddle on the second
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day and petered out on the third. The
Allied commMd postponed its attack
and waited for reinforcements. The first
real battle for Tunis and Bizerta started
on December 3, when a British infantry
and tank division, reinforced by an
American motorized division, renewed the
bid for Tunis along the Tebourba road.
The I talo-German forces stopped the tank
spearhead; their aviation bla ted the
road clean of enemy tanks as the land
forces passed to the counterattack, oc-
cupying Tebourba, pushing further west
and folding up the remnants of the three
divisions 011 the lower spurs of the Atlas
Mountains. The enemy also dropped a
contingent of 600 paratroopers bet\\:een
Tunis and Bizerta, but the Italians
captured 20 officers anel 210 men an?
alUlihilated the rest. The Anglo-Amen-
can indigna.tion over the failtu'e mounted,
not so much ill London-where they were
accllstomed to bad new!';-us in America,
where the press stressf'd the need of a
t\\'in offensive. Christmas Day found the
Americans ill the hills north of Medjez
el Bab busy hurling counterattacks
again. t the advancing Axis troops in a
futilc endeavor to stop them.
In the south, "Free French" troops
recentlv detached to reinforce the battered
Ameri~ans were hurled back from Pont
du Fa,hs, while still further south the
American troops were dislodged from
Kairouan and pushed ,vest up the lower
hills of the Atlas range. The yf'ar dosed
with the Brit.ish Wa.r Office admitting
that the daring coup of the British First
Army on Tunis anu Bizerta. had failed
by a hair's breadth. Acting 8wiftly, the
Axis had succeeded in three things: first
in creating a bridgehead nrouncl Tunis;
f'econdh7 in maintaining a corridor towa,rd
Libya; -a.nd thirdly. toward the end of
January, in establishing contact between
Marsha,l Rommel's army and the troops
.of Colonel General Ji.irgen von Arnim in
'l\misitt.
The beginning of 1943 found the AWed
command in North Africa asking for
,more men, more wea.pons, a.nd more
planes, which had all to be transported
in badly needed. hips.
SUCCESSFUL DELAYING ACTIONS
The arrival of Marshal Rommel's
troops in the Tunisian theater of opera-
tions compelled the Allies to revise their
battle formation. The American Fifth
Army now had to assume a new direction
of movement, shifting the bulk of its
forces to" ard the southeast in the direc-
tion of the Gulf of Gabes. The American
Fifth Army was to advance from central
Tunisia to the coast of the Gulf of Gabes
and in this way to cut through the junction
of Marf'hal Rommel with Colonel General
von Arnim. The chief characteristic of
the new Allied command, headed by
General Dwight Eisenhower, was a justi-
fied caution in the face of It resolute
enemy.
Once more the Axis interfered with
Allied plans, when a sudden, vigorous
ltalo-German offensive ill February led
to the occupation of Gafsa., Sbeitla,
Kasserine. and Feriana, with the Axis
troop' rea.ching the western extremity. of
Shott el Jerid. All the pa ses headmg
from the Atlas :Mountains to the ph"ins
of central Tunisia were now occupied.
Once again the key to the A:~is success
was quick decision and rapidity in strik-
ing. The American Fifth Army retired
behind the Tunisian-Algerian border.
Man." prisoner. and huge boo~:v had
fallen into the hands of thc AXIS, cwd
the frustration of General Ei cnbower's
plan to establish contact between the
Fifth and Eighth l\Tmies was extremely
important from a strategic point of view.
March began quietly. On March II,
Marshal Rommel was recalled by the
FUhrer. The Americans were putting out
feelers toward the regions occupied by
the Axis, and in the south and north
the First and Eighth Armies were pre-
paring for a co-ordinated offensive. But
General von Arnim was first. He at-
tached the First Army and occupied
Cape Sen-at and Sedjenane, inflicting
heavv losses in men and material on the
ene~)' and relieving the pressure on
Bizerta. In the south, the !tala-German
forces upset the plans of the Eighth
A.rmy by striking hard at it before it in
turn was ready. But in the central
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sector the Americ;"l,ns had meanwhile
r ceived strong reinforcements. They re-
turned to t,he nttack with a big tank
force. In order to avoid encirclmllent,
the Africa Corps rctired to the i~thmus
between Unbes and Shott el J crid.
~USSES REPLACE STRATEGY
Ever 'ince the jnnction of the Africa
Corp with the Axis armies in Tunisia
toward the end of January. anti pcLrticll-
lad? since the Axis victories in February,
the Anied High Command lta,d realized
tha.t it had a big fight on its hands with
an enemy who u ed his flmal! forces with
admirable, kill and to the ntmost advan-
tag. It was ueeided in future to avoid
battle on an equal footing and i.llst,ead
to hoke the Axi., forccs by pressing them
with nch overwhelming masses of troops
and steel that all the ,kin of their com-
mauders all the courage and expcl'if'nce
of their veteran 01dier8, ''''ould be of no
(\,\-I\il to them. Thus a,ll tllrough Feb-
Tl1l1.I'y and Mar·h large armies and arma'
m('ut were amn. sed. ~ot onlv nil
of t.he Briti h wn.r effort was no'~: eon-
ntra.ted in Tunisia but that of t,he
Am rioan a well.
At til end of March tile Allie' were
ready. A gigantic truggle began to rage
along the entire Tunisian front. Under
the impact of terrific Allied artillery
bombardments and in order to forestall
th till'eat of being cut off by the re-
organized and reinforced American Fifth
Army the Axi force withdrew to the
north. The enemy aAlvance was kept n,t
a slow pa,ce by brilliant counterattacks
and defensive action on the part of the
reMguards. On April J the Gabes isthmus
wa evacuated for new positions fnrthf'r
north; fax Wfk abandoned on April 11,
and I ou se fOlU clays later. The enemy
had by no\\' accur~nl1ated an enormOl;s
uperiority in men and material. The
pressure exerted all along the front line
wa continuous, and fighting went on
without re~pite.
The front was now reduced to a line
running from Cape Serrat in the north
through Bou Arada to the C'ORst north of
SOUSSE'. During the third week of April,
the left wing of the Axis was the chief
target of attack. But the It.aJian cLivi-
::;ion8 PiF'toia, Folgore. and Trieste put
up 'uch a resistance that in the end the
enemy had to desist from further att,::lCk~.
The AlJies gradually moved their ef'nter
of gravity westward and then 011 to the
northern sector.
At the end of April the entin' front
was aflame. with the Allies using fresh.
strong tank and infantrY forces. a.lwavs
trying to effect cL brea:k-througb. B~lt
not until til(' enemy reached n superiority
of f;C'vell to onE' in armored cars and thn'c
to one ill artilif'ry. without counting
the slq)('riorit.' in planes, did he succf'ed
in achieving the first hreak-through.
On l\:la.~' (I a strong encmy aUac'" by
massed infantry and tanks pic'rct'd t,Le
Axis lines on thf' road to }Iateur and
occupied Olio' town. Tuni;.; and Bizerta
hnd to be evacuated on May., \\'hile
the i"outlwl'll front still prO\'ed impassahle
to all cnf'my attac:ks. the Italo-(~errnan
troops in the north fell hack to ;In irn-
prm'i;wd line reaching frurn til(' Ba.,· lIf
Tunis to a point ~.-) kilometer" eu."t. of
Pont dn Fahs. Twu da,'" later the
f'nf'my \\'a" able to hrea.k· through this
line and reach the coast southwest
of Nabeul.
The Ita,lian First Army, encirded f'ast
of Pont du Fahs, continued to fight
tenaciously. counterattacking wi til in-
domitabe courage. But in the ot her
parts of the Tnnisian f ron t the Axis
troops '''ere compelled to cease fight,ing
when their amlDunit,ion was exbau"ted.
On May II. (;pneral Messe. the com-
mander' of the Italian .Fir~t· Anm'. re-
jected a proposal to capitulate. ]~ut un
the follo"ing day the situation became
huI')('!pss. Alt,hough the po"itions of the
Italian army "'ere still intact. its art.il!prv
tire slackened and then ceased for wa,;'t
of ammunition. All its material wa,R
destroved. An\' further sacrifice would
have . seemf'd ·useless. and tht' Duee
mderpd the Italian First Arm v. which
had the honor of putting up' tIl(' last
resistance on African soil, to cea·se
fighting.
To evaluate the significance of the
three years of African war, we must
consider them in the light of the strategic
situation of the rest of the world. II
the Allies want to win the war, they must
fight decisive battles on the European




make Europe and East Asia impregnable
to invasion, the Axis needed time, time
to consolidate its great victories between
September 1939 and June 1942. The
task of gaining this time was entrusted to
the Italian and German forces in North
Africa. It was fulfilled by them against
huge odds in an exemplary fashion.
THE SOUTHERN FLANK
The occupation of Tlmisi", by .411ied forces has silllplified the p,:cture of thp.
mililary situation ifl J::luope. JWJt 11..'1 there are .,.0 Allied trt)0lJs all the Burope"'l
COlltillent (except at Gibralt<lr), St) there are TW lllllye'r Glly GernwfI f)'r ltaliall "rlllie.,
beyoTld the borders of the Contiflent. The prelilllinarietJ (Ire Oller, alld the real battle
can begin. Tile A lliea no 10fl.ger haL'e any excu"e fur Twt attemptill(J the e.it"blish.
ment of a second froTll. They have 50,000 kilometers ofAxis,coTttrolled European
coast l'ine to choose frolll. '['his e'luals three times the length nf the entire couoSt of
Africa. Tile landing itself. of wllrse. u:ill be the least part of the enterprise. The
Allies fOl/lld this out at Dieppe. The real problelll be(Tins after U landi'lIg /", been
efferted.
Whether, tellell. fl'here, nrvJ how the Allies teill tT'lJ an illva8'iofl, 'We do not
JOIOW. Glle possibility, however, is arl attack from the sOlltll. The sOu/.h"rn shore
of Eurcpe hU$ dO ftlr been accorded little aUention U8, pr,w.r to the fall of Tlt/lidi.l.
all attack against it IJ'IIS most ulllikely, The following urtiele disclusses ?lot the
problem of a second froTll 'in general but only this southem ft<lIlk a lid the possib-ii'ities
't offers for auack and defwde.-K.M.
I T has happened but rarely that Europehas been invaded from the southacros~ the wide moat of the Mediter-
ranean, which separates southern Eul'ope
from Africa and the Near East. In his-
toric times such invasion~ took place
almost exclusi\Tely across the two na.r-
rowest port.ions of the moat-the Strait
of Gibraltar (16 kilometers wide) and the
Straits linking the Mediterranean with
the Black Sea (the Dardanelles, 1.3 kilo-
meters, and the Bosporus, 0.66 kilomet.ers
wide at their nalTowest points). One
except,ion, the Persian landing at Mara-
thon in 490 B.C., which was made from
Asia )finor across the Aegean Sea, was a
disastrous large-scale "Dieppe." But
most invasions of Europe across the
narrows-by the Persians across the
Dardanelles in 480 and :179 B.C., and by
the Carthaginians via Spain in the third
centurY B.C.-also ended in disaster.
Only two invasions of Europe from the
south led to important successe. , and both
were the result of dissension and treason
on the European side.
INVASION A~D TREASON
Roderick. the lMt king of pre-Moorish
Spain had ascended the tiu'one in a
struggle with hi~ predecessor King Witiza.
In 711, the friends of Witiza called upon
Tariq, a Moorish general in Korth Africa,
to aid them against Roderick. They
provided him with ships with which he
was to cross the Strait of Gibraltar, and
thought that he would go home once he
had done his duty. Tariq came. Roderick
was overwhelmed by the combined forces
of the Moors and the Spanish followers
of Witiza but, instead of returning to
Africa the Moors remained on European
soil~ventually occupying the entire
Iberian peninsula-for almost eight cen-
turies, down to their final expulsion in
1492. The name of Tariq still lives to
this day in the name of Gibraltar (Gebel
aI-Tariq = Rock of Tariq).
At the eastern end of Europe's southern
flank, at a time when the Moorish control
over Spain was on the wane, a child,
John the Fifth Palaeologus, ascended the
